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Disability: a justice-based account
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Abstract Most people have a clear sense of what they mean by disability, and have
little trouble identifying conditions they consider disabling. Yet providing a clear
and consistent definition of disability is far from straightforward. Standardly, dis-
ability is understood as the restriction in our abilities to perform tasks, as a result of
an impairment of normal physical or cognitive human functioning (in combination
with our social, political, and environmental context, and our resource share).
However, which inabilities matter? We are all restricted by our bodies, and are all
incapable of performing some tasks, but most of these inabilities are not considered
disabilities. If, then, we are to avoid the category of disability becoming overly
broad—and thus politically and practically useless—we need some way of picking
out the specific inabilities that are disabling. I argue that our answer should be
informed by an account of the opportunities individuals are entitled to be able to
perform as a matter of justice. Thus, to be disabled is to have these opportunities
restricted, and not to deviate from the species norm or lack any ability that might
improve our well-being.
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1 The problem of defining disability
My goal is to defend a new account of disability: one that is indexed to an account
of distributive justice, or what individuals are entitled to. Yet it may seem that
determining how disability should be defined needs no further investigation. Most
people have a clear sense of which conditions they consider disabling. Further, there
is broad philosophical consensus on some central features of an account of
disability. First, there is a widely accepted distinction between impairment as
physical or cognitive features that cause deviation from a biological or statistical
norm of species functioning, and disability as a restriction in our ability to perform
tasks.1 There is considerable agreement, too, that disability is caused in part by
impairment, and in part by an individual’s social and political context, and the
resources they have access to.2
I do not intend to challenge the consensus on either point. Rather, I ask: if
disability is the restriction in our ability to perform tasks, then which inabilities
matter? In other words, which of the limitations that result from individuals’
impairments, in combination with their context and resources, should be considered
disabling? We are all restricted by our bodies, and are all incapable of performing
some tasks, but most of these inabilities are not considered disabilities. An account
of disability is an essential prerequisite to formulating public policies that safeguard
the just treatment of disabled individuals, and an account cannot form the basis of
such policy if it simply concludes that ‘everyone is disabled’. If, then, we are to
avoid the category of disability becoming overly broad—and thus politically and
practically useless—we need some way of picking out which inabilities are relevant
to defining disability. Only then can we identify and respond to the injustice,
discrimination, and mistreatment to which so many disabled individuals are subject.
I begin, in Sect. 2, by considering and rejecting alternative accounts of which
inabilities are disabling: those entailed by ‘normal’ species functioning (Buchanan
et al. 2000; Daniels 1985), those that undermine well-being (Kahane and Savulescu
2009; Savulescu and Kahane 2009), and those considered relevant by disability
activists (Barnes 2016a). I demonstrate that the latter approach leaves disability
underspecified, whilst on the former two approaches disability will be ubiquitous.
As such, all of these alternatives prove an inadequate basis for public policy,
political campaigning, or activist movements. I argue, instead, that the relevant
opportunity losses involve restrictions of individuals’ entitlements (Sect. 3). Thus, I
define disability as the restriction in the ability to perform those tasks human beings
1 For example: Terzi (2004), Nussbaum (2006), Shakespeare (2006), Smith (2001), Buchanan et al.
(2000), Oliver (1996). Though some recent work questions this distinction (Barnes 2018, 2016a).
2 In other words, we should reject both a strict medical model of disability (according to which disability
is straightforwardly caused by individual impairment), and a strict social model (which denies this causal
relationship, insisting instead that disability is solely the result of unjust social structures). Whilst social
structures can certainly be disabling, it is also clear that disability could not be eliminated by social
changes alone (Barclay 2010: 161; Shakespeare 2006: 46; Terzi 2004). Hence, we should adopt a hybrid
account, which acknowledges the influence of social factors, without ignoring the impact of impairment
(for example, Wolff 2009a; Kahane and Savulescu 2009; Shakespeare 2006; Terzi 2008; Daniels et al.
2009).
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are entitled to be able to perform as a matter of justice, as the result of the
interaction between an individual’s impairment, their social and political context,
and the resources they have available to them. This provides a framework account
of disability. To determine whether an impairment is actually disabling will require
an account of our distributive entitlements, but this is not a prerequisite to accepting
the general claim that individuals are disabled when their access to these
entitlements is restricted (as a result of their impairment and context). (As
subsequent discussions will illustrate, the case of disability does give us some
reason to favour particular accounts of distributive justice over others, but I will not
attempt to mount a definitive defence of one particular approach here.)
In Sect. 4 I consider some possible objections to the definition I have sketched.
First, it may seem that if being disabled means lacking what we are entitled to, then
in cases where this cannot be rectified, this cannot be unjust. This implies
individuals with serious impairments would not be considered disabled on my
account. Second, in part to avoid the former objection, I adopt a broadly-specified
and multiply-realisable conception of entitlements: for example, as opportunities for
mobility, communication, or forming relationships. This leaves me vulnerable to the
further worry that individuals will not be considered disabled, or entitled to
assistance, even when unable to perform important functionings (walking, hearing,
easily reading social cues) if they have more general capabilities in these domains. I
respond to these objections in Sects. 5 and 6.
I finish, in Sect. 7, by considering the revisionary and counterintuitive
implications of my account. It will, for example, imply that individuals with
significant and visible impairments may not be disabled by them, that individuals
with apparently minor or invisible impairments may be disabled, and that
individuals’ status as disabled may change across time and context. However, I
argue that far from giving us a reason to reject my approach, this is one its key
benefits. The intuitions with which this approach may clash ought to be challenged:
our understanding of disability should no longer focus on bodily difference or
deviation from what we take to be the norm, and should instead reflect a concern
with the opportunities that all individuals ought to have access to, and which are
closed to so many.
2 What disability is not
2.1 Disability and impairment
In this section I outline and critique alternative accounts of disability. However, I do
not challenge the distinction between disability and impairment, or the consensus
that the cause of disability involves both individual impairment and wider context.
This terminology is worth clarifying. Impairment can be understood as ‘‘departure
from human normality’’ (Terzi 2008: 43) or atypical forms of physical or cognitive
functioning, and might include blindness, deafness, and mobility impairments, as
well as non-standard cognitive functionings experienced by individuals with autistic
spectrum conditions (ASCs), Down’s syndrome, or Alzheimer’s. Disabilities are the
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‘‘activity limitations, and participation restrictions’’ that may result (WHO 2017).
There are various views on which such limitations are disabling. For example, those
who subscribe to a species norm approach deem the relevant functioning restrictions
to be those ‘‘that individuals in someone’s reference group (e.g. adults) are
ordinarily able to do’’ (Buchanan et al. 2000: 286). The goal of the paper is to
defend a different approach.
Distinguishing disability and impairment draws attention to the contingency of
the connection between bodily and cognitive difference and having a disability,
which also depends on context, resources, and personal features. Indeed,
highlighting this contingency was a major motivation behind the development of
the social model by the disability rights movement.3 Further, as we will see, this
distinction both allows us to campaign against disability, as restriction, without
suggesting that we should seek to normalise human bodies and minds by eliminating
impairments, and enables us to describe the shared experience of atypical
functioning of those who have an impairment, whether they are disabled by it or not.
Nonetheless, objections may be raised against this terminology. First, whilst
common among disability scholars and activists, outside this community this
language might strike some as clumsy and counterintuitive. We are very used to
calling people with impairments—of vision, mobility, cognitive function—disabled,
without paying much attention to the restrictions in activity or participation they
may or may not face. It may seem awkward to insist that an individual in a
wheelchair—often the literal poster-child of disability—is merely impaired, and that
this might not translate into a disability. Yet this discomfort is often grounded in the
unexamined assumption that differences in physical and cognitive functionings must
manifest themselves in restrictions of ability, and the associated belief that the
impaired body or mind is, itself, the problem. These intuitions, however strong,
ought to be questioned, as the disability rights movement has long argued.
A second, more serious worry concerns the potential normative implications of
labelling individuals ‘impaired’. This is not intended to be an evaluative concept. It
simply provides a way of distinguishing disability, which (partially) results from
impairment, from other forms of disadvantage, such as that associated with some
racial or gender identities, or sexual orientation.4 Further, (almost) everyone in some
way deviates from the norm; hence, has an impairment. Nonetheless, this term has
connotations of deficiency, defect, and imperfection. It may, therefore, seem more
3 The social model not only drew a conceptual distinction between impairment and disability, but, in
some iterations, disputed the causal connection between them (see fn.2).
4 This is in addition to the other noted benefits: highlighting both the contingency of the connection
between impairment and disadvantage, and the shared experience of atypical functioning. A further
reason to accept this distinction is that I am not convinced by the arguments of its primary opponent—
Barnes (2016a: 23–28, 2018)—for its rejection. Briefly, these are: first, that our judgements about who is
impaired rely on our intuitions about disability, and that there is no distinct explanatorily and
extensionally adequate account of impairment; and, second, that this will lead to an overly disembodied
view of disability focussing merely on social exclusion and ignoring the ‘‘messy reality’’ of having a
disabled body (Barnes 2018: 1158). I believe these claims can best be refuted with a neutral account of
impairment, though I cannot rehearse these arguments here (see Begon (unpublished).) For further
critiques of Barnes’s view of impairment, see Howard and Aas (2018) and Francis (2018).
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apt to refer to ‘difference’, ‘diversity’, or ‘heterogeneity’. I do not do so only to
avoid the proliferation of competing terminology. However, to emphasise,
impairment is synonymous with difference rather than deficiency.
Yet this neutral account of impairment may seem to leave my approach
vulnerable to a third objection: that it will render the category of disability over-
inclusive. As noted, part of the reason to accept the standard distinction between
disability and impairment is that this helps to distinguish disability from other forms
of socially-mediated disadvantage. However, if impairment implies mere atypicality
(rather than deficiency) then it may still seem to include almost everyone: even
individuals with better than normal functioning may count as impaired, in obvious
tension with its usual meaning. The most straightforward response here is to note
that accepting my general account of disability does not hang on accepting this view
of impairment. It is possible to agree that individuals are disabled when they lack
the opportunities they are entitled to, though to focus on cases in which this results
from functioning in a ‘deficient’ or ‘unhealthy’ way.
More substantively, I believe both that there are positive reasons to adopt a
neutral account of impairment, and that this will not render disability problemat-
ically over-inclusive, though I lack the space to fully defend either claim here.5 To
briefly tackle the over-inclusiveness worry: first, it is true that better functioning
individuals will count as impaired (assuming functionings can meaningfully be
described as simply ‘better’, as opposed to better suited to a particular context).
However, describing Michael Phelps (to take Barnes’s (2016a: 14–15) oft-cited
example) as impaired is hardly implausible if this just means he functions
atypically. The important question is whether he is disabled—whether he lacks
opportunities he is entitled to—and it is clear that he is not. A broad account of
impairment does not necessitate a broad account of disability, then. Second, racial
identity and sexual orientation will not count as impairments insofar as racial
5 See Begon (unpublished). In brief support of the neutral approach: first, it avoids the implication that
the appropriate response to impairment must be to cure or eliminate it, which seems to follow if
impairment is taken to imply deficiency or ill-health. Second, it avoids the difficult task of determining
which ways of functioning are non-contextually worse: whilst certain forms of physical and cognitive
functioning do not fit well with some environmental contexts it is far from straightforward to identify a
principle that determines which deviations from the norm are simply negative. Finally, the neutral
approach provides a means of responding to a worry that might be raised about under-inclusiveness: if
impairment is deficiency then those whose functioning cannot plausibly be described as deficient, such as
some autistic persons, will not be considered disabled. One means of avoiding such exclusion is to allow
that individuals may be disabled if they are merely perceived as, or treated as if, they are impaired
[indeed, the ADA has taken this approach (see Francis 2018 for discussion), and for a defence of this
position see Aas (2016) and Howard and Aas (2018)]. This move is unnecessary if impairment merely
implies difference: these individuals straightforwardly count as impaired insofar as their functioning is
atypical, and are disabled if they lack opportunities they are entitled to. No claim about deficiency is
necessary. Thus, we need not attempt the thorny challenge of formulating an account of deficiency. Nor
need we distinguish those in the disabled community who are ‘really’ impaired (i.e. defective) and those
who are wrongly perceived as such. For further arguments against this approach see Begon (unpublished).
However, it is worth emphasising that accepting the central claim of this paper does not demand
acceptance of these arguments: perhaps individuals are disabled when they lack the opportunities they are
entitled to as a result of being perceived to function in a deficient (or, indeed, merely atypical) way.
Disability: a justice-based account
123
phenotypes and preferences cannot plausibly be described as functionings.6 Sex-
based differences may seem to present a harder case since there do seem to be
differences in the functional capacities of average male and female-bodied persons,
most obviously (though not only) relating to differences in their reproductive
capacities. We do not need to accept the existence of a strict binary, or a
metaphysically deep reason to appeal to reference classes based on sex categories,
to allow that our assessment of typical functionings can be indexed to the capacities
of biological females and males. Thus, a male is not impaired by their inability to
bear young.7 A neutral account of impairment, then, need not lead to the inclusion
of other forms of disadvantage in the category of disability.
2.2 Species norm accounts
I therefore accept the distinction between disability and impairment, where the latter
concept will make some reference to normal species functioning, but nonetheless
reject accounts where disability itself comprises the loss of species-normal abilities.
The most obvious worry is that these accounts will be over-inclusive since
individuals depart from the species norm in many trivial (or even beneficial) ways.
Raising an eyebrow might be a species-normal ability, but those who lack it surely
are not disabled. Allen Buchanan et al. (2000: 285) attempt to avoid this problem by
distinguishing ‘‘impairment of normal species functioning’’ from disability as the
resulting inability to perform a significant range of tasks. To illustrate, they consider
someone who cannot hear sound at a particular range of frequencies, yet in whose
environment nothing ‘‘she is likely to be required to do or would benefit from
doing’’ requires hearing sound in this range (Buchanan et al. 2000: 287). This
individual thus has an impairment, but this does not translate into a disability.
6 I assume that preferences and appearance do not constitute ways of functioning though they may be
functional, but I lack the space to defend this view. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this
point.
7 It might seem that trans persons are a difficult case to accommodate here. Whilst I cannot attempt a full
account of this complex and controversial topic, it is not immediately obvious that this must be so.
Roughly I would suggest, first, that either conforming to, or subverting, socially-constructed gendered
behaviours should not be considered a form of physical or cognitive functioning, but a preference about
how to live our lives. Thus, individuals whose gender presentation is non-binary or does not conform to
their assigned sex should not be understood as having an atypical functioning capacity. Second,
individuals who change their sex identity or change their body to corresponded to their true sex might be
impaired if they are unable to perform functionings that are typical for this sex. For example, trans women
who are unable to bear young or menstruate could be said to function atypically, and could potentially be
disabled too, depending on the consequences of such restrictions, just as natal women who cannot so
function might be. This does not imply that there is anything pathological about mere possession of a
trans identity, thus following the DSM-5 (2013) in accepting that ‘‘gender nonconformity is not itself a
mental disorder’’. {I leave aside, here, the question of whether there may nonetheless be reasons for trans
persons to choose to adopt a disabled status if this is the only way to ensure their rights are protected [as
Wahlert and Gill (2017) argue]}. This would not hold true if we do not believe individuals can choose or
change their sex, in which case these trans women would be normal functioning male-bodied persons
with female gender identity and presentation—and thus not impaired. I take no view on which approach is
correct, but merely sketch how they may be accommodated. For further discussion of these issues see, for
example, Bettcher (2014a, b), Dembroff (forthcoming), Jenkins (2016).
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However, this distinction between inabilities to perform species-normal
functionings and species-normal tasks is difficult to draw—at least, without some
additional account of which of these tasks are ‘significant’. Indeed, in describing
their example, Buchanan et al. (2000: 287) make reference to what we might ‘‘be
required’’ to do or ‘‘would benefit’’ from doing. By (implicitly) drawing on these
ideas they can avoid the inclusion of trivial inabilities. However, this also suggests
that their means of identifying relevant restrictions is not purely based on a species
norm, and so is no longer a species norm approach.
Furthermore, this approach’s focus on ‘tasks’ may mean it is under-inclusive.
Consider, for example, individuals who suffer from chronic pain, anxiety, or
depression, but who are nonetheless high-functioning and able to perform all
species-normal tasks (or those they are required to do, or that benefit them). These
cases are analogous to the individual who cannot hear particular sound frequencies:
they may not function as normal, but this does not translate into a restriction in their
abilities. Yet it is implausible to suggest that individuals who struggle with pain,
anxiety, and depression are not disabled until this manifests in an inability to
perform tasks. Buchanan et al. could respond by adopting a more expansive
understanding of tasks, and thus of disability. They might point out that performing
tasks whilst suffering is not species-normal: we should not focus just on what people
can achieve but on whether their method of achievement is normal. This response
would, indeed, allow them to include individuals with chronic pain, depression, and
so on, but would seem to come at the cost of also including their hearing-impaired
person, and other trivial cases. After all, the species-normal way of performing the
task of hearing includes, inter alia, not being in pain and hearing sound frequencies
within a certain range. This fully inclusive approach is both implausible and
contrary to their stated view. The route out would involve an appeal to which of the
atypical ways of achieving a task are relevant or significant and this, as noted, takes
us beyond the appeal to mere species norms. (As Sect. 6 will consider, this route is
open to me since I am explicitly committed to a principle that identifies which of the
various ways of performing atypical functionings are disabling.)
Accepting an account of impairment grounded in species norms does not raise
the problems that plague this approach to disability. First, impairment should be an
expansive category. Thus, we need not resist the inclusion of the individual with the
mild hearing impairment, and those with anxiety, depression, and chronic pain—and
even those who cannot raise an eyebrow, or Michael Phelps. This does not imply
that disability must be similarly all-encompassing since, unlike Buchanan et al., I
explicitly offer a criterion to identify which of the associated restrictions are
disabling. Second, if impairment is normatively neutral—synonymous with
difference, not defect—it is not vulnerable to a final objection often raised against
species norm accounts of disability. This is the worry that focussing on an idealised
conception of normal species functioning entails a corresponding disrespect of, and
insult to, those who fail to meet this ideal. For example:
the whole ideology of normal functioning is seen as primarily constructed…to
control and exclude disabled people from active and full participation in social
Disability: a justice-based account
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and institutional arrangements which have no interest in accommodating them.
(Terzi 2009: 90)
An account of impairment that is indexed to species norms merely acknowledges
that many (or all) of us are not ‘normal’ in various ways and, whilst not problematic
in itself, this can, in some circumstances, prevent us from having the opportunities
we are entitled to. The same can be said of gender and racial identities and sexual
orientation without implying any such identity is deficient.
2.3 Welfarist accounts
The second account of disability I will consider is the welfarist approach. This is
most clearly and explicitly defined and defended by Kahane and Savulescu (2009:
53), according to whom disability is a:
stable physical or psychological property of subject S that tends to reduce S’s
level of well-being in circumstances C, when contrasted with a realistic
alternative, excluding the effect that this condition has on well-being that is
due to prejudice against S.
Thus, the relevant inabilities, on this view, are those that reduce welfare.
Perhaps the most obvious problem with this account concerns the difficulties in
developing an account of welfare. Whilst Kahane and Savulescu aim to remain
neutral between alternative accounts, there are problems with any that might be
incorporated. This reflects the more general difficulties with formulating a clear and
satisfactory account of welfare, which cannot be rehearsed here.8 However, in brief:
first, a subjective account of welfare, relying on the individuals’ self-assessment,
will inevitably raise reliability concerns. The various ways in which self-reported
levels of happiness, contentment, or preference-satisfaction, can be misleading have
been well-documented.9 Yet moving toward a more objective understanding of
welfare brings its own problems. For example, the difficulty of finding a non-
arbitrary way of compiling a list of basic goods, or the worry that this list will entail
the paternalist imposition of a perfectionist conception of the good, or that it will be
elitist and exclusionary. Further, we may be sceptical about the implication that
something can be considered good for someone independently of their attitudes
towards it, and indeed, despite their own insistence to the contrary.
A further problem in the social justice context is the epistemic difficulty of
assessing welfare in many cases. For example, Kahane and Savulescu (2009)
discuss the ‘Ashley treatment’, named after a child with severe cognitive
impairments who was given treatment to restrict her further growth and prevent
puberty. They argue that though this treatment moved Ashley further from the
species norm, it lessened her disability since it improved her welfare. This stands in
stark contrast to, for example, Eva Feder Kittay’s discussion of the case, in part
8 Some of the many contributions to this debate include: Scanlon (1975, 1998), Griffin (1986), Crisp
(2006), Sumner (1996), Parfit (1984).
9 For example, Kahneman et al. (1982), Elster (1987), Khader ( 2011).
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because Kittay employs a different understanding of Ashley’s welfare. She contends
that ‘‘[w]e take pleasure and pride in our bodies as they grow and mature
because…we do. Full stop. It needs no further justification. It is constitutive of a
thriving life’’ (Kittay 2011: 621). Yet evidently Kahane and Savluescu do not
recognise this value. These epistemic difficulties are especially intractable in cases
such as Ashley’s where it can be hard to ascertain the view of the individual
concerned, and far from clear that those who have not experienced this condition
can understand what would be required for her to thrive.
Thus, Kahane and Savulescu’s definition does not determine who is disabled, but
simply moves the debate to a new context: finding a satisfactory account of welfare.
This is an important gap in their approach. However, the fact they have not filled it
does not mean it cannot be satisfactorily filled (though given how long this debate
has raged, scepticism regarding its speedy resolution seems justified). Further, a
welfarist might respond that disability should not be easy to define, and that my own
approach will face similar worries—there is, of course, no consensus on what justice
demands. However, these epistemic worries are, perhaps, deeper for welfarist
approaches—at least for those that include an element of subjectivity in their
account of welfare—since they necessarily require a direct reliance on first person
testimony. Moreover, whilst we may not have reached agreement on a complete
theory of justice, it might be easier to agree on basic entitlements and so basic
injustices than it is to identify core instances of welfare deficit. Further, we
may need to agree on certain essentials of a theory of justice, unlike welfare, if we
are to determine how the benefits and burdens of social cooperation are to be
distributed (Rawls 1999: 5). For example, it is, perhaps, easier to agree that
individuals are entitled to equal political participation, opportunities for mobility,
and the ability to form relationships than it is to show that all these capabilities will
make all individuals better-off, given the existence of the idiosyncratic preferences
of the politically apathetic, sedentary, and misanthropic. Thus, disagreements about
what makes life go well may be harder to settle even in apparently core cases, as
examples like Ashley illustrate. Yet welfarists could doubtless disagree. As such,
noting the lack of a widely-accepted account of welfare raises a worry that demands
a response, rather than providing a decisive refutation of the welfarist view.
The deeper problem for this view is that, whatever account of welfare is used,
disability will be ubiquitous, and this will prove problematic from the perspective of
justice and public policy. As Kahane and Savulescu (2009: 30) openly acknowl-
edge, disability will be a degree rather than a threshold concept. Thus, ‘‘everyone
has disabilities of one kind or another’’.10 I agree that there can be a degree of
10 Arguably, Terzi’s (2008, 2009) approach could also be included as welfarist. Terzi adopts a capability
approach to disability, and so understands impairments as disabling insofar as they cause a loss of, or
restriction in, capabilities. However, she understands the capability approach as an account of subjective
well-being, and so considers the loss of capabilities to entail the loss of components of well-being. Thus,
individuals are disabled by capability loss because this renders them worse off. For example, she suggests
that whether a wheelchair user has a capability depends on her ‘‘most valuable ends’’ and her ‘‘attitude’’
(Terzi 2009: 99): if these are such that she cannot fulfil her goals as the result of being in a wheelchair
‘‘her well-being appears to be restricted…and hence the full set of capabilities available to this person is
diminished’’ (Terzi 2009: 100). If we interpret Terzi as implying individuals are disabled whenever their
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arbitrariness in determining the boundaries of disability. I agree, too, that we have
reasons to expand this category (as Sect. 7 discusses). Nonetheless, we should be
cautious of expanding it so far that it becomes meaningless, as it will be if it is a
category in which everyone is included.
If every stable physical or psychological property that lowers our welfare counts
as disabling, then this definition does not seem to pick out the right cases—or, not
only the right cases. At least, not in the context of social justice, where our concern
is identifying disadvantage and determining how the state should appropriately
respond. It is certainly worth emphasising that disability is a continuum, and that we
are all restricted by the limitations of our bodies and minds. Nonetheless, when
fighting against ableism and injustice, simply concluding that ‘we are all disabled’ is
unhelpful. Similarly, we may wish to reject binaries of sexual orientation and gender
identity, and deny that racial categorisation is possible, yet nonetheless find it useful
to refer to ‘women’, and ‘gay people’, and ‘black people’ as a means of identifying,
and fighting against, injustices against these groups. ‘Disability’, I contend, has
value and meaning as a way of identifying, and responding to, disadvantage. The
term has little function if entirely ubiquitous.11
2.4 Barnes’s social constructionist approach
Barnes, like many others, rejects the social model’s exclusive focus on external
causes of disability, and emphasises that our understanding of disability should be
grounded in an assessment of individuals’ physical features—or, ‘‘what their body is
(really) like’’ (Barnes 2016a: 38).12 However, she also emphasises that particular
qualities are considered significant not because of their objective features, but
because of how we think about them. Barnes further argues that those best placed to
determine which features should be considered disabling are disability activists.
Thus, ‘‘disability just is whatever the disability rights movement is promoting
justice for’’ (Barnes 2016a: 43). Inclusion in the category of disability therefore
depends on ‘‘rule-based solidarity among people with certain kinds of bodies’’
(Barnes 2016a: 46).
However, there may be problems with relying on such rules. First, we should not
unquestioningly accept the content of these rules. Whilst disabled individuals’
testimony should undoubtedly play an important role in developing an account of
disability, it does not follow that the rules adopted by the disability rights movement
will be free of bias. Individuals who already ‘count’ as disabled may have vested
interests in excluding others from entering this group, and perhaps diluting the
strength of their claims with the accretion of many others. This need not be a
Footnote 10 continued
well-being is restricted and capabilities diminished as a result of an impairment, then disability would
also be ubiquitous on her account.
11 Further, though we do not want to replicate a common-sense understanding of disability, it should not
be entirely divorced from our intuitions. Indeed, Kahane and Savluescu (2009: 19) themselves object to
the species norm approach on this basis.
12 Barnes discusses only physical, and not cognitive, disabilities.
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conscious process of exclusion. Individuals may simply tend to see their own
impairments as the paradigm, and be less inclined to include those they are less
familiar with. Thus, we should not assume that disabled individuals’ epistemically
privileged position regarding their own experience extends to understanding the
diverse experiences of all disabled people.13 Nor can we assume that a group
fighting against injustice will never unjustly exclude others. Consider, for example,
the exclusion of asexual individuals by some in the LGBTQ ? community, or the
exclusion of trans women by some feminists. The point is not that such exclusion is
unjust, but that the question is not resolved by observing that existing members of
the community determined these boundaries.14
A related worry is that, given the heterogeneity that exists between and within
such groups, disagreement about the content and application of the rules of
inclusion seems likely, and difficult to resolve. Barnes (2016a: 49) acknowledges
the diversity of disability rights movements, and allows that it may be ‘‘simply
vague or indeterminate which social group is referred to…[as] ‘the disability rights
movement’’’. Her response is to insist that ‘‘this entire domain…is riddled with
indeterminacy’’ (Barnes 2016a: 49), and that it would be ‘‘deeply implausible’’ if it
turned out that ‘‘any aspect of our complex, multifaceted social reality had fully
determinate boundaries’’ (Barnes 2016a: 50). It is true that any definition will likely
include borderline cases. Indeed, an account that provides a firm and unequivocal
distinction seems to have missed something important about the category of
disability. Yet even if the boundaries are somewhat indeterminate, we still need
some sense of where they lie, and I am sceptical that the implicit rules used by
disability rights movements will be sufficient for this task.15
Further, I believe there are deeper flaws in Barnes’s approach, which can be seen
by considering two criteria Barnes (2016a: 10–13) sets out for a successful account
of disability: first, that it should not prejudge normative issues and, second, that it
should deliver the correct verdict about paradigm cases. These criteria will not be
met by my account, but I contend that an account of disability need not—and,
indeed, should not attempt to—fulfil these criteria. Considering the latter first, it is
not clear why it would be a virtue of an account to be ‘correct’ about paradigm
cases. Whilst we may worry about an approach that bears no relation to our
understanding of disability—for example, an account that includes homosexuality—
we should also be aware that our sense of the ‘paradigm’ is often informed by
intuitions that are based on prejudice about, and misunderstanding of, disabled
lives.16 As noted, these worries may not be solved by allowing those who are
already considered part of this ‘paradigm’ to be the arbiters of who else will be
included.
13 For a discussion of the impact of restricted information on the reliability of individuals’ choices and
preferences see Begon (2018a).
14 Similar worries are raised by Campbell and Stramondo (2016), Wasserman (2018), and Howard and
Aas (2018: 1127).
15 Also see: Wasserman (2018: 254), Howard and Aas (2018: 1115), Francis (2018).
16 As Sect. 7 considers and Barnes (2016a: 119–142, 2009) herself has pointed out.
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Next, Barnes (2016a: 11) insists that ‘‘[i]t should not be built into the very
definition of disability that disability is something that’s bad or suboptimal’’.
However, it is only important that disability be value-neutral if we follow Barnes in
rejecting the distinction between impairment and disability.17 If we accept this
distinction, we can allow that disability is necessarily disadvantageous and still
maintain a normatively neutral account of impairment, capturing the heterogeneity
of human bodies and capacities, which may be disadvantageous in some contexts
but need not be so. This does not undermine the possibility of being proud of our
diverse bodies and minds. However, conflating these terms makes it near impossible
to achieve the twin goals of recognising that diversity need not be negative, and that
it can be correlated with disadvantage, which must be identified to be rectified.
Barnes meets her own criteria, and so argues that disability is a ‘mere difference’.
Yet this does not mean it has no effect on individuals’ lives. On the contrary, it
‘‘may be good for you, it may be bad for you, it may be utterly indifferent for you’’
(Barnes 2016a: 98). Indeed, Barnes allows that being disabled may sometimes lower
overall well-being, that some aspects of some disabilities are bad-differences
(Barnes 2016a: 75), and even that some specific disabilities are bad simpliciter
[something that makes ‘‘your life go worse in virtue of it specifically’’ (Barnes
2016a: 87; 102)]. By including diverse conditions within this wider category, it
becomes true that disability is not necessarily a bad-difference, but this category
still encompasses conditions (whether few or many) that are bad-differences.18
Clearly, then, Barnes does not believe that ‘‘the positive effects [of disability]
have to balance the negative ones’’, and accepts that ‘‘in the world we inhabit,
disability tends to significantly reduce one’s good options’’—contra the claims of
some of her critics (Kahane and Savulescu 2016: 777, 776).19 Nonetheless,
espousing a ‘value-neutral model’ or ‘mere-difference view’ of disability can be
importantly misleading, especially if this is used to ground general claims about the
kinds of policies that should be pursued with regards to disability. Certainly we
should acknowledge that it is ‘‘simply untrue that, as a general rule, disabilities are
bad for those who have them’’ (Campbell and Stramondo 2017: 176). Thus, claims
rooted in the general assumption that someone’s life will be worse simply because
they have ‘a disability’ are unjustified.20 However, we should also avoid grounding
claims about policy on the assumption that all disabilities should be treated as
neutral simply because this category incorporates conditions with good, bad, and
neutral effects. For example, we may accept that disability is a mere-difference in
Barnes’s sense, but still believe, contra Barnes (2014, 2016a), that it is sometimes
wrong simpliciter to cause some disabilities.21 Amalgamating all disability into a
17 See Begon (unpublished) and Sect. 2.1 for a defence of this distinction.
18 In other words, Barnes’s conception of neutrality is very weak (see Wasserman 2018: 254–256;
Hawkins 2018: 463–466; Dougherty 2014).
19 For Barnes’s response, see Barnes (2016b).
20 More precisely, since unlike Barnes I distinguish impairment and disability: because they have an
impairment widely assumed to be disabling.
21 See Begon (2018b); Wasserman (2018: 255).
J. Begon
123
general ‘value-neutral model’, then, can obscure the disadvantage that can be
associated with impairment.22
How problematic this is may depend on the context in which our account of
disability is employed. My focus here is relatively narrow: aiming to develop an
account that can guide theory and policy that aims to identify and mitigate the
disadvantage associated with physical and cognitive difference. Such policies
should be nuanced and individualised, as I will argue. They must acknowledge that
some impairments, for some people, in some contexts, are not neutral—or merely
‘‘a minority body’’ (Barnes 2016a: 1)—and should not be treated as such. Thus, in
this context, at least, it seems unwise to remain committed to a unified category of
disability so broadly construed.
Like the welfarist account, then, Barnes’s approach shifts the focus of the debate
rather than settling it: determining how to respond to disability will require
identifying which aspects of which disabilities are bad differences. Neither approach
settles the question of when disability is a disadvantage of the kind the state should
mitigate. Thus, neither approach can form the basis of public policy or political
activism. Whilst we must have a value-neutral account of physical and cognitive
difference (which I call impairment), we also need a concept that can play a role in
political debates about when difference is disadvantageous, what constitutes
injustice towards disabled individuals, and the policies that should be pursued to
respond to this.
3 Which inabilities matter?
Not all restrictions in individuals’ capacity for activity and participation are
disabilities: we are not disabled if we cannot sing, cannot stand on one leg, or cannot
raise an eyebrow. This is so even if these abilities are species normal, and even if
restrictions in them decrease our welfare. I argue that the relevant restrictions are in
abilities that individuals are entitled to be able to perform. I will begin by
considering a specific application of this approach: the case of deafness. The
impairment here is the inability to hear, whilst the disability is the reduction in
relevant opportunities that may arise when most people communicate via speech,
such as difficulties in political participation, access to appropriate education, and
forming meaningful relationships. Deaf individuals are not disabled on the basis that
they are unable to hear music, or the voices of their loved ones. However, this need
not be because opportunities for aesthetic experience or forming relationships are
22 As such, Campbell and Stramondo’s (2017: 163–165) suggestion that disabilities are intrinsically
neutral, but not instrumentally, comparatively, or overridingly neutral, seems a more plausible and
nuanced view. Nonetheless, there may be reasons to worry that their account could also be employed in a
way that obscures disadvantages associated with impairments insofar as they tend to consider disabilities
‘‘in isolation from their effects’’ (Campbell and Stramondo’s 2017: 163), where this is usually taken to
mean those that are most obviously detrimental to well-being. It is not clear that uncontroversially
harmful elements of impairments such as pain, fatigue, or disturbed or depressed emotional states can be
meaningfully isolated from these conditions. However, I lack the space to defend this claim here (see
Begon (unpublished)).
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not considered central entitlements. On the contrary, they may well be central—we
simply do not need to hear music or voices to have them. Being entitled to
opportunities in a domain need not require having every opportunity. Thus, if deaf
individuals have access to other aesthetic experiences, their inability to hear music
is not a concern of justice. Indeed, if deaf individuals have all the opportunities they
are entitled to, they are not disabled.
My claim, then, is that individuals are disadvantaged when their access to their
entitlements is restricted, and disabled when this results from an impairment (in
combination with context, resources, and personal characteristics).23 Thus,
individuals with the same impairments may not be identically disabled, and
individuals’ status as disabled may change over time even if their impairment does
not alter. Rightly, then, we cannot know whether an individual is disabled merely
from information about their impairment. The account is intended to be a
framework into which various theories of distributive justice can be incorporated.
Accepting the general claim that individuals are disabled when their impairments
restrict their access to forms of activity and participation they are entitled to does
not require accepting a particular conception of entitlements.
However, there is (at least) one approach to distributive justice that cannot be
incorporated. My account distinguishes what individuals are entitled to from what
merely decreases their welfare. As such, it cannot accommodate those welfarist
approaches that consider anything that lowers individuals’ welfare—whether state
oppression or stubbing our toe—to constitute a relevant disadvantage. Subjective
accounts, which do not distinguish the different reasons for a decrease in hedonic
state or the different sorts of preferences individuals may care to have satisfied,
would collapse into the welfarist accounts discussed in Sect. 2.3 and so face the
same worries about over-inclusiveness and the ubiquity of disability raised there.24
My approach relies on the general anti-welfarist intuition that ‘‘[s]ome deprivations
of capabilities [or resources] express greater disrespect than others, in ways any
reasonable person can recognize’’ (Anderson 1999: 332). This distinction is
employed widely in the distributive justice literature, by theorists who disagree on
23 This approach may seem similar to Haslangerian models of disability (see Haslanger 2000; Barnes
2016a: 28–38; Howard and Aas 2018), and certainly shares the goals of her ameliorative project. On one
plausible iteration of a Haslangerian account, to be disabled is to be in a bodily or psychological state
assumed to be an impairment in the prevailing ideology, where this marks one out for pity, stigma and
exclusion, and where the fact one is in this state plays a role in one’s systematic disadvantage (Howard
and Aas 2018: 1113, 1128–1129). Unlike the account I defend here, this approach is focused not on the
specific ‘‘valuable activities’’ individuals are excluded from Howard and Aas (2018: 1113), but with the
cause of this exclusion: that it results from possession of a feature that, within the dominant ideology,
marks one for this exclusion. As such, this view will be more and less inclusive than my own. Individuals
may be disabled though they face very little actual disadvantage [for example, Oscar Pistorius (Howard
and Aas 2018: 1129)]. Further, individuals may not be deemed disabled though they face a restriction in
opportunities they are entitled to due to atypical bodily or cognitive functioning, if this atypicality is not
assumed to be an impairment in the prevailing ideology (for example, the case of obesity discussed in
Sect. 7, which though clearly stigmatised is not generally pathologised as an impairment in Howard and
Aas’s sense).
24 It is worth noting that it is both implausible that individuals are disabled by anything that lowers their
subjective welfare, and implausible that such individuals lack what they are entitled to as a matter of
justice, though I cannot defend this stronger claim here.
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much else, and has strong intuitive pull.25 It is the suggestion that individuals should
be entitled to vote in elections, to be mobile, and to access educational
opportunities, but are not entitled to access every ride in an amusement park, or a
sports car, or an expensive musical instrument—and that this is so even if they
would prefer these latter opportunities, and they would have a greater positive
impact on their welfare. In other words, this is the claim that only some domains of
life are the concern of justice, and that the scope of these domains is not determined
by individuals’ preferences.
Beyond this restriction, then, adopting a specific theory of justice is not a
prerequisite to accepting my account of disability. However, it is difficult to defend
this account in the abstract, and cumbersome to run through every possible way to
cash out individual entitlements. Thus, I will talk in specific terms, employing an
approach with three key features. First, I will assume individuals are entitled to
capabilities, understood as control over certain domains of their life, rather than
merely access to resources (Begon 2017). Second, our conception of entitlements
should be relatively thick: not merely entailing the fulfilment of basic needs, but
including access to opportunities such as forming social relationships, engaging in
leisure activities, and enjoying aesthetic experiences. Finally, I assume that
individuals are entitled to broadly specified opportunities, and not particular or
identical functionings: for example, opportunities for aesthetic experiences,
mobility, or communication, and not hearing music, walking, or talking.26 These
features have not been selected at random. I believe there are good reasons to opt for
an account of distributive justice with these features, and that reflection on disability
can help demonstrate why this is so, as much of the subsequent discussion will
illustrate. However, I certainly cannot definitively refute all alternative understand-
ings of entitlements here, so will leave it to their adherents to demonstrate how they
can navigate the issues disability raises.
4 Feasibility, levelling-down, and thinning-out
I will now outline some possible objections to the account I have sketched, and in
responding to them in subsequent sections will elucidate my account. First, it may
be objected that if being disabled means lacking opportunities we are entitled to,
then impairments that result in the loss of significant opportunities will not be
considered disabling if we cannot prevent this loss, since we cannot be entitled to an
opportunity it is impossible to provide. Thus, if, due to lack of medical or
technological knowledge, or merely lack of resources, we cannot prevent
25 For example, Anderson (1999), Dworkin (2000: 61), Carter (2014: 84–85). I will not defend this
distinction here (see Begon 2016).
26 Approaches that accept some version of the second criterion but not the third—i.e. an expansive, but
narrowly specified set of entitlements—are common (arguably including: Dworkin 2000; Nussbaum
2000; Cohen 2011; Rawls 1999; Anderson 1999). I have defended the third criteria elsewhere (Begon
2017). Also see Asch and Wasserman (2005) for an argument that individuals need not have access to
every opportunity.
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individuals being rendered immobile, unable to communicate, or to form
relationships, then they cannot be entitled to these opportunities, and cannot be
considered disabled by their absence. If this were so, serious impairments—perhaps
the most serious impairments—would not be considered disabling on my account.
Clearly, this would be very counterintuitive.
Further, this understanding of our entitlements presents a dilemma. On the one
hand, this may lead us to conclude that individuals with serious impairments should
simply have different entitlements. That is, if some individuals can only be provided
with a restricted set of opportunities, then their entitlements are correspondingly
diminished. On the other hand, we may wish to resist this tiered, non-universal
approach to entitlements, and insist instead that all humans are entitled to the same
opportunities (though not, of course, to the same outcomes). Yet this seems to imply
that the content of everyone’s entitlements should reflect the unavoidable constraints
on some individuals’ functioning. In other words, that we can be entitled only to
what can be provided to all. If we grasp this latter horn, the content of our
entitlements might start to look rather thin. This is implausible in itself and will
generate an implausible account of disability if my approach is employed. For
example, if we cannot currently enable everyone to control their mobility then no
one can be entitled to this opportunity, and individuals whose control over their
mobility is impaired are not disabled by their inability.
However, this is an artificial dichotomy. If we reject an implausibly strict
egalitarian view, according to which everyone must be enabled to perform an
identical set of functionings, and instead consider individuals to be entitled to
generalised opportunities—for example, mobility, not walking (i.e. the third
criterion outlined above)—then it may seem that everyone can have the same
entitlements. Thus, we can avoid a tiered approach without levelling-down our
entitlements to include only those capabilities to function that can be universally
provided. That is, we should recognise that capabilities are multiply-realisable, and
treat different functionings as interchangeable and equally valuable. This will mean
that many individuals with impairments can have the opportunities they are entitled
to even if there are some functionings they cannot perform. Thus, even if we were to
limit our entitlements to those that could be provided universally, this might
eliminate less than it initially seems.
Nonetheless, this response will not prove fully satisfactory. First, even if the
opportunities individuals are entitled to are generalised and multiply-realisable there
will still be some cases in which they cannot be provided. Staying with the example
of mobility: though individuals with many mobility impairments can be enabled to
control their mobility, this may not be possible for individuals with locked-in
syndrome. Further, the very focus on multiply-realisable capabilities may generate a
further objection about the ‘thinning-out’ of individuals’ entitlements. It might seem
that if those who use a wheelchair have sufficient opportunity to be mobile, then
they have all they are entitled to. Thus, if, for example, it were possible to restore
functioning to a paraplegic person’s legs, even at very little cost, they would neither
be entitled to demand this from the state nor considered disabled if the treatment
were not provided. This is an instance of the more general worry that sufficientarian
approaches, by only ensuring individuals reach some threshold of achievement, may
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fail to eliminate radical, and potentially unjust, inequalities above this threshold. If
capabilities can be experienced in various ways, then individuals are neither
considered disabled by their inability to perform specific functionings (walking,
talking, hearing, seeing) nor entitled to be enabled to perform them, just as long as
they have more general capabilities (for mobility, communication, leisure, aesthetic
experiences) at some appropriate level. I will now respond to these objections.
5 Identifying distributive entitlements
I turn, first, to the objection that individuals with serious impairments will not be
considered disabled if the opportunity loss associated with their condition cannot be
avoided; and, further, that we will therefore face the dilemma of either decreasing
entitlements for this subset of individuals or levelling-down entitlements generally.
This is based on the assumption that the demands of distributive justice must be
realisable: that if an individual is entitled to something, it must be feasible to
provide it to them. However, we need not accept this assumption.27 It is quite
plausible to suggest that we are currently unable to rectify some instances of
injustice. Thus, some individuals may not be able to access opportunities that justice
requires they have. If a just state of affairs is not currently realisable then they
cannot have a claim that anyone now provides these opportunities, though they do
have a claim that we work towards a situation in which their provision is feasible. If,
for example, we believe all humans are entitled to control over their mobility, then
this cannot mean the state has an obligation to provide this to someone with locked-
in syndrome if this is impossible. However, they do have an obligation to enable
them to have such control if it were, and to work towards releasing this state of
affairs. Further, the individual with locked-in syndrome is disabled because they
cannot be provided with an opportunity that they should have access to: that they
should be enabled to perform if this were possible.
A situation in which some individuals lack opportunities that everyone should be
entitled to may be unjust, then, even if no one is guilty of causing this injustice and
no one has a direct duty to rectify it. Some may find the suggestion that entitlements
should be conditional in this sense implausible: how can we be entitled to something
no one has a duty to provide? It is worth noting, first, that the alternative approach
has similarly unappealing implications: if we want a universal list of entitlements
and can only include items on this list when they can currently be provided to every
individual, then we may not even have a general right to nourishment, say, if it is
currently logistically impossible to ensure everyone has this opportunity. We may,
therefore, accept that some entitlements should lack a feasibility constraint, but
believe these conditional or proto-entitlements should be distinguished from
entitlements proper, where the former are what all individuals are (conditionally)
owed as a matter of justice and the latter are those claims that we can press against a
27 I cannot attempt to conclusively refute the feasibility constraint on justice here, but for an excellent
argument for its rejection, see Gheaus (2013).
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specific duty-bearer. The former constitute part of the content of a theory of
distributive justice: the list of capabilities (or primary goods or human rights) to
which all individuals have a (conditional) entitlement, even if they temporarily
cannot be provided with every item on this list. Indeed, this captures what seems so
objectionable about situations in which individuals do not have the opportunities (or
resources, or rights) we think they ought to: individuals may not be wronged when
they cannot be mobile, or nourished, and so on, but they should have these
opportunities if it were possible and we should work to make this so.
The important point is not the choice of terminology, but the general claim that
the set of entitlements specified by a theory of distributive justice are, in a sense,
owed to all, even when this obligation cannot feasibly be met. The sense in which
they are owed is that these opportunities (resources, rights) should be provided if
they can be, and that the state (or other relevant body) should not artificially limit
the boundaries of the possible. This means that not all disability will be the result of
unjust behaviour—though, of course, some will be. Sometimes the state may fail to
fund research to develop technologies that increase impaired individuals’ function-
ing capacity, or design material infrastructure in avoidably exclusionary ways. Yet
sometimes the restrictions to individuals’ entitlements may be ineliminable and
unavoidable: perhaps due to natural obstacles, perhaps due to competing claims on a
limited pool of resources, or to conflicts between different forms of accommodation
(certain policies may render some impairments non-disabling (indeed, may be the
only way to do so) whilst at the same time exacerbating others). Thus, the content of
our (conditional) universal distributive entitlements should not be determined by
what it is feasible to provide universally.
Understanding entitlements in this way means we need not grasp either horn of
the above dilemma: we can have a universal set of entitlements that is not levelled-
down to include only those opportunities that can be achieved by all. However, this
does not imply that the content of our entitlements can or should take no account of
feasibility whatsoever. We could, for example, take the view that humans should be
entitled to the opportunities necessary for a decent life, where this will be informed
by our reasonable expectations of what such a life entails. On this view, controlling
our mobility might be central to such a life; the ability to fly would not be. Further,
the content of our reasonable expectations for a decent life can be predicted to
change over time, as technology improves. The point, here, is not to identify the
specific content of our distributive entitlements, nor even to outline the method by
which they would be determined. Rather, it is to note that this might depend on what
it is possible for humans to do, and on what we think humans ought to be able to do,
without implying that all these entitlements must currently be achievable for every
human. In other words, entitlements can be indexed to what is feasible for most,
without requiring that they can be provided to all (though we should strive to
achieve this).
Two further objections may be raised against this response. First, if our
entitlements depend to some extent on our reasonable expectations about a decent
(or dignified, or flourishing) human life, and our expectations are informed by what
humans, as a species, can generally do, then this might seem to collapse into a
species norm approach. That is, our entitlements are simply identical to species-
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normal functionings. Yet this is not the case. Even without specifying the content of
our entitlements we can see that they will be both narrower and broader than
species-normal functionings. They will be narrower, first, because on any plausible
view trivial human capabilities will not be central entitlements (the ability to roll our
tongue, sing, or stand on one leg). Individuals who thus deviate from the species
norm do not lack opportunities they are entitled to. Our entitlements are narrower,
too, if understood as general opportunities, rather than the performance of specific
functionings. An individual can have what they are entitled to (the capability for
mobility, say), even if there is a species-normal functioning they cannot perform
(walking using their own legs). Additionally, our entitlements will be broader, since
we may be entitled to more opportunities than those that are ‘natural’ or normal for
our species.28 As medical, social, and technological progress expands the scope of
human capacities, our reasonable expectations of a decent life and the opportunities
we should be entitled to will surely reflect this.
A second objection concerns the potential ambiguity regarding when it is
‘feasible’ to provide an opportunity, given that this may require radical expense of
time or resources. There are two forms of this worry. First, if we could all be
enabled to fly, say—if the government were to divert all research funding to this
project—then should this opportunity be an entitlement, which we are disabled in
the absence of? Clearly the answer is no. When this is a mere abstract possibility,
such a functioning is unlikely to feature in our reasonable conception of a decent
life, or what we can reasonably expect from the state. However, I would concede
that if a way of enabling humans to fly were discovered and made available to the
majority, then we might expand our conception of our entitlements to include this.29
In this imagined scenario this is no more a reduction ad absurdum of my approach
than acknowledging that individuals’ capacity for mobility should take account of
modern transportation and that, as such, someone who could only get around at the
speed and distance walking and running would usually allow may not have what
they are entitled to in this domain. To emphasise: insisting that we can be entitled to
opportunities it is infeasible to provide universally does not mean our entitlements
must be entirely unmoored from what is feasible for most.
Second, and perhaps more troubling, are cases in which an opportunity is
available to most individuals, but can only be provided to a minority at great
expense. For example, if an individual with locked-in syndrome can control their
mobility only with an extremely expensive piece of equipment, are they entitled to
it? No doubt there will be many difficult cases, but our approach to such questions
must involve weighing up the capabilities provided to the minority against those lost
by the majority. Thus, if the cost of providing this equipment meant others suffered
premature death or significant impairment then the individual surely cannot be
entitled to their mobility in the face of these costs. In this case, we can continue to
28 The species norm approach will be restricted to ‘natural’ human abilities if we follow Daniels (1985:
28) and derive it from the ‘‘design of the organism’’, rather than ‘‘merely a statistical notion’’.
29 Thanks to Paul Billingham for pushing me to clarify this point.
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say that it is impossible for the individual to be mobile and they are unavoidably
disabled, since their entitlements cannot be provided at a reasonable cost.30
6 Beyond minimal functionings
I now turn to the worry that understanding entitlements as general, multiply-
realisable opportunities will mean that individuals will not be considered disabled
even when they lack important opportunities. First, I consider Anita Silvers’s
objection to what she takes to be capability theorists’ approach to educational
provision for individuals with impairments. This, she claims, would only provide
‘‘educational opportunity adequate for a dignified life, which…may not even…rise
to the level of average educational attainment’’ (Silvers 2009: 181). Silvers
discusses a child with a hearing impairment, who struggles to catch all the
information imparted in class due to the difficulty of lip-reading in this context.
Nonetheless, she is denied a translator since her educational attainment is already
above average (Silvers 2009: 177–182). Silvers objects that it is unfair that children
with impairments are unable to fulfil their potential simply because their educational
environment is not designed to support them. Further, it might seem that, on my
view, these children would (implausibly) not be considered disabled by this
restriction in their access to education, because ‘they already have what they’re
entitled to’.
However, contra Silvers, a decent education surely requires more than the
opportunity for some minimal educative outcome, such as passing grades.31 More
plausibly, this requires something like ‘the opportunity to develop our potential to a
similar degree as our peers’. This must be at least part of the goal of education, and
we would fail to show individuals equal concern and respect if we provided this to
some and not others.32 This does not mean that there will not be difficult cases,
where the needs and requirements of different children pull in different directions,
and limitations of resources mean that an ideal learning environment cannot be
provided for everyone. However, as discussed, the fact that something cannot
30 This does not imply scarcity is wholly irrelevant to our entitlements. Again, my claim is only that the
possibility of universal provision is not a prerequisite to something being an entitlement. Feasibility,
including considerations of scarcity, may play a role in determining where the boundaries of our
entitlements lie: for example, as discussed, via informing our reasonable expectations about the shape of a
decent life. Returning to the above example, if individual jet-pack technology were created but was
prohibitively expensive and/or relied on a resource too scarce for it to be made available to all, then this is
not likely to feature amongst our reasonable expectations and thus our entitlements. In contrast, if this
could be provided near-universally, became the dominant mode of transport and a prerequisite for
participation in various aspects of social and political life, then this may be amongst our (conditional)
entitlements.
31 The same is true if we focus on other criteria to identify entitlements, such as leading a dignified or
flourishing life. Indeed, if a criterion did not have this implication, this would surely count as a reason
against its adoption.
32 See Terzi (2008) for a capability approach to education for children with impairments.
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currently be universally provided does not mean that we cannot reasonably include
this amongst our entitlements.
Yet it may be objected that education is a special case. Whilst the very goal of
education involves enabling individuals to develop their talents and abilities, having
opportunities for mobility, communication, or leisure surely does not require being
able to fulfil our potential in these domains. It seems much more plausible to suggest
that we are here entitled to something like acceptable options and the capacity to
meaningfully choose between them. As such, individuals who achieve mobility with
a wheelchair rather than by walking, or communicate using Sign rather than speech,
or look at art because they are unable to listen to music, are not considered disabled
by this restriction in their ability to function; nor would they be entitled to an
operation to restore the use of their legs, or cochlear implants to restore their
hearing, even if this would not be costly.
In these cases, I would bite the bullet—though with some important caveats. I
would accept, then, that if we lived in circumstances in which individuals with
impairments had all the opportunities they are entitled to then they should neither be
considered disabled nor necessarily entitled to state assistance. For example, if an
individual with a mobility impairment could control their mobility without being
dependent on others, then they may not be entitled to be enabled to walk.33
Similarly, a deaf individual who had access to leisure activities and aesthetic
experiences (and every other capability they are entitled to) would not be entitled to
cochlear implants to allow them to hear music. Nor would these individuals be
considered disabled.
The caveats, though, are to point out, first, that often individuals with
impairments do not have what they are entitled to. In many cases the restrictions
in their capabilities are avoidable, and could be eliminated by changing social
infrastructure and norms. However, this is not always so. In some instances, this is
because we lack the technology or resources to prevent some impairments from
restricting individuals’ opportunities. In others, this is because individuals’ needs
conflict, and there is no way to structure the external environment that would
eliminate all restrictions. For example, ‘‘[p]eople with mobility issues who do not
use wheelchairs may find that steps are safer and easier for them than
ramps…[w]heelchair users may have problems with tactile paving which gives
locational cues to visually impaired people’’, and so on (Shakespeare 2006: 46).
These cases can prove as intractable as those in which we simply lack the ability to
institute the relevant change. As such, the appropriate way to mitigate the
disadvantage associated with an impairment may not be to change the environment,
and this might be so even when the disadvantage is a result of that environment.
Thus, to conclude that if an impairment were not disabling (did not result in relevant
restrictions) an individual would not be entitled to state assistance does not imply
that now, or in the near future, treatments that mitigate impairments would not be
provided.
33 Exactly how much of their environment would have to be inaccessible to conclude that an individual
lacks control over their mobility is ambiguous, and I will not attempt to settle this question here.
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The second caveat is to note that suggesting that such treatments may not be a
matter of entitlement does not imply that they are banned or restricted. Any liberal
approach to distributive justice will aim to ensure both fairness in distribution, and
individuals’ freedom to form and pursue their own conception of the good. Thus, if
an individual desires to walk, or hear, or see, they will not be prevented from
pursuing these goals. Indeed, in a situation in which individuals had access to all the
central capabilities (or primary goods, or equality of Dworkinian resources) there
would be sufficient resource equality that individuals would have the ability to
achieve these goals (especially on the above assumption that these treatments are
inexpensive). Indeed, my account does not even rule out state provision or subsidy
of these options on the grounds of public choice, if the decision is procedurally just
and does not divert resources from the satisfaction of actual entitlements.34
One final sense in which our entitlements might seem too minimal on my
approach relates to an objection earlier raised against the species norm approach.
This is, that by focussing on what individuals are able to do, I take insufficient
account of how much more difficult this may be when we have an impairment.
Someone who uses a wheelchair, for example, may have the capability for mobility,
but this will often be restricted by both the built and natural environment. Thus, they
may find travelling much more physically demanding than, for example, walking a
similar distance. Or, an individual in chronic pain may be able to perform all the
functionings that a person without this condition can, yet they must struggle against
the pain that accompanies every functioning they perform. I certainly want to resist
the implication that the difficulty of performing tasks would not be considered a
relevant dimension of disadvantage, and that individuals who experience such
difficulty would not be considered disabled, nor entitled to assistance to mitigate it.
Whether this is indeed an implication of my approach depends on the sensitivity
of our conception of distributive entitlements not just to what we can do, but also to
the pain and effort that must be expended to do it. I would contend that such
concerns should feature in our understanding of individuals’ entitlements.35
Although I cannot provide an independent defence of this here, it is important to
note that insisting that a theory of distributive justice is sensitive to these
considerations is not merely a post hoc modification to ensure that my definition of
disability remains plausible. On the contrary, the above examples give us reason to
think that individuals should be entitled not just to the mere capacity to perform
some functionings, but to be able to do so without associated pain, and without
having to expend massively more energy than others to achieve the same outcome.
Thus, the point is not that an account of our entitlements that ignored the pain and
effort required to achieve them would generate an implausible account of disability
if my framework is employed, but that this would be an independently implausible
account of our entitlements.
34 Thanks to Carl Fox for helping me clarify this point.
35 For approaches that do so, see Wolff and de-Shalit (2007), Wolff (2009a, b), Cohen (2011), Anderson
(1999). It may be a problem with Nussbaum’s (2000, 2006) and Sen’s (1999, 2009) approaches that they
do not clearly incorporate such concerns.
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7 What counts, who’s disabled?
I will finish by considering whether my account will prove to be too revisionary.
Certainly, the impairments that would be considered disabling do not neatly cohere
with our intuitions in a number of cases. As emphasised from the outset, my account
will imply that individuals with visible impairments may not be disabled by them,
that individuals with seemingly minor or invisible impairments may be disabled,
and that individuals’ status as disabled may change across time and context.
However, far from giving us reason to reject this approach, this is one of its key
benefits. As Sect. 2.4 discussed, there is little point in devising a definition that
captures all paradigm case when we have good reason to think the paradigm is
informed by prejudice and misinformation.
First, many paradigm impairments, such as deafness, blindness, paraplegia,
achondroplasia (a common form of dwarfism), ASCs, and Down’s syndrome need
not be disabling on my account. If individuals have the opportunities they are
entitled to—perhaps as a result of adequate infrastructure, access to resources, and
lack of bias—they will not be considered disabled merely on the basis of their
impairment. Disability does not consist in bodily or cognitive difference, but in
specific opportunity losses that might result. This does not imply that we cannot
campaign for the better treatment of individuals with impairments, or for their
access to their entitlements. However, we should not assume that having an
impairment, especially a visible impairment, must be disadvantageous. We should,
instead, focus on the specifics of each case and determine whether an impairment is
actually associated with restrictions in individuals’ activity and participation. The
reality often will not accord with our unexamined intuitions.36
My approach will also produce deviations from the paradigm in the other
direction: many non-paradigm cases, such as depression and anxiety, and even
obesity or shyness, might be disabling. Further, individuals who have body integrity
identity disorder (the strong desire to amputate a healthy limb) may be disabled by
being prevented from undergoing this amputation, insofar as living with a limb they
disassociate from disrupts their access to capabilities: for example, making social
interaction difficult.37 I will consider perhaps the most controversial of these
examples: obesity. I am aware that both disabled and obese individuals will likely
object to this implication, given the unjustified stigma attached to both labels. It is
worth emphasising, then, that though I consider an obese body an impairment (after
all, it is a deviation from the species norm), I am not suggesting that it worse, or
36 As noted in Sect. 2.1, part of the motive behind the introduction of the social model, and the rhetoric of
claiming that ‘‘disablement is nothing to do with the body’’ (Oliver 1996: 35), was to resist the
medicalisation of disability and to highlight the contingency of the connection between impairment and
disadvantage.
37 For discussion of these cases, see Bayne and Levy (2005), Mu¨ller (2009).
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necessarily disadvantageous, to have such a body. However, this is a dimension of
difference, like many others, that may be associated with disadvantage.38
My focus is not the possible (and sometimes controversial) correlation between
obesity and health conditions such as high blood pressure, diabetes, heart attack, or
stroke. Even leaving these aside merely having an obese body can be disabling. Our
built environment is made for human bodies of a particular size and weight. As Gay
(2017: 184) says, ‘‘[t]here are very few spaces where bodies like mine fit’’. One
simple and important example is chairs: aeroplane seats, restaurant booths, lecture
theatres, cinema seats. If these cannot accommodate individuals with larger bodies,
this can be hugely restrictive to those who possess them, limiting opportunities to be
mobile, to access education, or to engage in many leisure activities. In addition, an
obese body may be restrictive independently of the design of material infrastructure,
rendering ‘‘impossible’’ activities like standing for long periods or walking a mile
uphill (Gay 2017: 16). Finally, the bias, stigma, and abuse obese individuals are
often subject to, the commentaries on their bodies by friends, family, medical
professionals, and strangers, and the assumptions made about their capacities may
further limit their capabilities. Options may be closed to them because others
assume they are incapable of exercising them (for example, not being offered
certain jobs), or they may lack internal capabilities (for example, not feeling
qualified to apply for these jobs in the first place).39 In all these ways, obesity—like
other forms of physical and cognitive difference—can be disabling.
The final counterintuitive implication is that what counts as a disability on my
view will be contextualised, and may change over time. This can happen in at least
three ways. First, as society becomes better able to accommodate impairments, and
enable different forms of functioning, then these impairments will cease to be
disabling. This is not because these impairments are ‘cured’, but because their link
with disadvantage is severed. For example, if the oft-discussed examples of
deafness and mobility impairments no longer lead to capability loss, then
individuals with these impairments may not be disabled, though they still cannot
hear or walk unaided. Whilst this may seem counterintuitive to some, it accords
with the experience of many disabled individuals, who do not regret, or demand
compensation for, the different ways they function. Consider, for example, Harriet
McBryde Johnson’s (2003) account of the pleasures of wheelchair use, and the
misperceptions of those who do not use one:
I used to try to explain the fact that I enjoy my life, that it’s a great sensual
pleasure to zoom by power chair on these delicious muggy streets, that I have
no more reason to kill myself than most people. But it gets tedious…they
don’t want to know. They think they know everything there is to know just by
38 There are, of course, some differences correlated with disadvantage that we would not want to describe
as disabilities, such as our gender or racial identity, or sexual orientation. As Sect. 2.1 considered, this
need not be an implication of my view.
39 In Nussbaum’s (2000: 84) terminology, internal capabilities are ‘‘developed states of the person herself
that are…sufficient conditions for the exercise of requisite functions’’. Whether restrictions in internal
capabilities constitute a loss of entitlements depend on the conception of entitlements we employ. Again,
such examples may give us reason to incorporate them.
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looking at me. That’s how stereotypes work. They don’t know that they’re
confused.
Second, as our capacity to provide opportunities changes, individuals may be
entitled to more if the content of our entitlements depends on our reasonable
expectations. For example, we now expect leisure time, aesthetic experiences, and a
longer life than previously. Impairments that restrict access to these new
entitlements will then count as disabling, though individuals’ actual abilities have
not changed. One example here might be (some forms of) dyslexia. In a context in
which many are illiterate, this is unlikely to be disabling. In a context in which a
grasp of the written word is a prerequisite for many other opportunities, it would be.
Thus, dyslexic individuals may become disabled over time, or by moving. Consider,
for example, a dyslexic girl who emigrates from rural Gambia, where illiteracy is
rife and educational infrastructure underdeveloped, to the UK, where she has better
access to education, though her dyslexia is not fully accommodated. Whilst she is
now less disadvantaged (she now has access to education), she may also become
disabled insofar as it is now her impairment that restricts her access to education
(where previously it may have been poverty or sexism). Again, this seems to be the
right way to understand such cases.
Lastly, individuals who have impairments that involve periodic and perhaps
unpredictable flare-ups, such as fatigue and pain conditions, may have a changeable
disability status. Some will be disabled only during a flare-up, some may be disabled
during periods when flare-ups are common, and for some the mere possibility of a
flare-up may render them consistently disabled. For example, an individual with
epilepsy may never be able to drive a car, or an individual with ME may struggle to
retain employment if their impairment necessitates frequent absences.
8 Conclusion
It is a consequence of my approach that individuals are not categorised as disabled
in the way we might expect, and that who is included in this category may change.
Yet surely it is right to set aside our preconceptions about how bad some impairment
must be and focus instead on the actual restrictions individuals face, and on which
of these should be the focus of our concern. What matters—what is disabling—is
that individuals are rendered (often contingently) unable to be mobile, unable to
communicate or form social relationships, or unable to access education or
meaningful work as a result of their impairments. Not that they are unable to walk,
unable to listen to music, or unable to read emotional cues easily. Whatever account
of distributive justice is used, then, my approach to disability will be revisionary and
contrary to many common-sense intuitions about who is disabled. However, these
implications constitute a feature, not a bug. Our present intuitions concerning what
constitutes disability often reflect prejudice and bias, and should be altered. Further,
our account of disability should change over time, and reflect what individuals are
able to do, and what we think they ought to be able to do. The problem of disability
is the problem of losing significant opportunities—and not the ‘problem’ of
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deviation from the species norm, or the loss of our irrelevant opportunities—and our
understanding of disability should be reoriented to reflect this.
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